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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court 
vacating an arbitrator's award. Plaintif f Roadway Package 
System, Inc. (RPS) ships small packages for corporate 
clients. "Independent linehaul contractors," such as 
Defendant Scott Kayser, assist in its operations. RPS 
terminated Kayser's contract in 1998, alleging that he had 
failed to fulfill his obligations under the Linehaul 
Contractor Operating Agreement (LCOA), which governed 
their association. Kayser exercised his contractual right to 
demand arbitration and was awarded substantial damages. 
RPS then brought suit in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, asking the court to vacate the 
award. Applying the vacatur standards set forth in the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the District Court granted the 
motion on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded the 
scope of his authority. We will affir m. 
 
Kayser's appeal requires us to decide two questions of 
considerable significance for the law gover ning arbitration, 
both of which are currently the subject of circuit-splits. The 
first question is whether contracting parties may opt out of 
the FAA's default vacatur standards and fashion their own. 
Because the LCOA is a "contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce," 9 U.S.C. S 2, the FAA governs this 
case. Resolving a question previously r eserved by this 
Court, we first hold that the FAA per mits parties to contract 
for vacatur standards other than the ones pr ovided in the 
FAA. The FAA sets out "a substantive rule applicable in 
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state as well as federal courts," Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984), but its rule is simply that courts 
must enforce the terms of private arbitration agreements. 
 
The second question we must decide involves the 
conceptually complex issue of how courts should determine 
whether parties have contracted out of the F AA's default 
rules. The LCOA contains a generic choice-of-law clause, 
stating that it "shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania." Kayser submits that we should r ead this 
clause as expressing a desire to opt out of the FAA's default 
regime and to incorporate arbitration rules borrowed from 
Pennsylvania law. We disagree. 
 
We first explain why the choice-of-law clause sheds little, 
if any, light on the parties' actual intent. The issue before 
us is simply a matter of contract construction rather than 
one of choice-of-law. Because choice-of-law clauses are 
designed to deal with a different issue from the one with 
which we are currently faced, and because few federal 
statutes other than the FAA permit parties to contract out 
of their requirements, we do not r ead the LCOA's choice-of- 
law clause as evidencing a clear intent to displace the FAA's 
default regime. Our conclusion is consistent with 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,  514 U.S. 52 
(1995), and though Volt Information Sciences, Inc., v. Board 
of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 
468 (1989), may appear to the contrary, our r eview of that 
opinion, the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in 
Mastrobuono, and the unanimous holdings of six other 
Courts of Appeals convince us that Volt  is distinguishable. 
 
Because the presence of a generic choice-of-law clause 
tells us little (if anything) about whether contracting parties 
intended to opt out of the FAA's default standards and 
incorporate ones borrowed from state law, we must 
announce and apply a default rule. We hold that a generic 
choice-of-law clause, standing alone, is insufficient to 
support a finding that contracting parties intended to opt 
out of the FAA's default regime. This rule will: (1) ensure 
that parties who have never thought about the issue will 
not be found to have elected out of the FAA's default 
regime; (2) be comparatively simple for arbitrators and 
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district courts to apply; and (3) preserve the ability of 
sophisticated parties to opt out. Applying our rule to this 
case, we conclude that the District Court was corr ect to 
apply the FAA's vacatur standards. 
 
Analyzing the issue under those standards, we hold that 
the District Court correctly determined that the arbitrator 
exceeded the scope of his authority. Though our cases 
caution against exploiting an ambiguity in an arbitrator's 
award to support an inference that he or she exceeded his 
or her powers, they also establish that a reviewing court is 
not precluded from examining an arbitrator's statement of 
reasons. In this case, the arbitrator's written opinion makes 
crystal clear that his decision was based on the fact that he 
thought that RPS's procedures for notifying Kayser of its 
dissatisfaction with his performance wer e unfair. Yet the 
intrinsic fairness of RPS's procedur es was not before the 
arbitrator--he was empowered to decide only whether the 
termination was within the terms of the LCOA. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the District Court was corr ect in vacating 






RPS and Kayser entered into the LCOA in 1996. It 
required Kayser to conform to specified service and safety 
standards, and permitted early ter mination if he did not 
meet them. RPS terminated the LCOA in mid-1998, alleging 
that Kayser had repeatedly failed to fulfill his obligations 
under the contract. 
 
The LCOA is forty-one pages long and is divided into 
sixteen sections. This appeal implicates Sections 9 and 16. 
Section 9.3 binds the parties to arbitrate disputes and 
outlines the procedures for doing so. Its introductory 
sentence provides: 
 
       In the event that RPS acts to terminate this Agreement 
       . . . and [Kayser] disagrees with such termination . . . 
       then each such disagreement (but no others) shall be 
       settled by arbitration in accordance with the 
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       Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American 
       Arbitration Association . . . . 
 
Section 9.3(e) states: 
 
       The arbitrator shall have the authority only to conclude 
       whether the termination of [Kayser] was within the 
       terms of this Agreement, to deter mine damages if 
       required to do so under this subparagraph, and to 
       provide for the division of the expenses of the 
       arbitration between the parties. . . . If the arbitrator 
       concludes that the termination was not within the 
       terms of this Agreement, then, at the option of RPS . . . 
       (2) [Kayser] shall nevertheless be ter minated, and . . . 
       shall be entitled to damages equal to the arbitrator's 
       determination of what [Kayser's] net ear nings . . . 
       would have been during the period between the date of 
       termination to the last day of the ter m of this 
       Agreement, (without any renewals). [Kayser] shall have 
       no claim for damages in any other amount, and the 
       arbitrator shall have no power to award punitive or any 
       other damages. 
 
Finally, Section 9.3(f) specifies: 
 
       The arbitrator shall have no authority to alter , amend 
       or modify any of the terms and conditions of this 
       Agreement (including by application of estoppel, waiver, 
       or ratification), and further, the arbitrator may not 
       enter any award which alters, amends or modifies the 
       terms or conditions of this Agreement in any form or 
       manner (including by application of estoppel, waiver , or 
       ratification). 
 
Section 16 contains a generic choice-of-law pr ovision, 
stating that the LCOA "shall be governed by and construed 





Following RPS's termination of the LCOA, Kayser 
demanded arbitration, which was conducted befor e William 
Mechmann. Kayser sought $141,961.40 in total damages: 
$129,930.00 for projected lost profits plus $12,031.40 for 
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expenses incurred in purchasing a tractor -trailer at RPS's 
request. Arbitrator Mechmann ruled for Kayser and 
awarded $174,431.15 in damages--$32,469.75 more than 
Kayser originally requested. 
 
Mechmann's written decision consists of twelve short 
paragraphs. The first is irrelevant to this appeal. The 
second paragraph acknowledges that "[t]he arbitrator's 
authority is set forth in Section 9.3(e) [of the LCOA]." The 
third characterizes the "[t]he main question" before 
Mechmann as whether RPS's termination of the LCOA was 
"wrongful or proper." The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh 
paragraphs of the opinion focus on RPS's procedures for 
notifying independent contractors when it is dissatisfied 
with their performance and discuss the manner in which 
those procedures played out in Kayser's case. They read as 
follows: 
 
        The RPS procedure for dealing with per formance by 
       its contractors is commendable. [sic] Documentation of 
       breaches by the contractors are written up by Local 
       Managers. This is only verbalized to the contractor . . . . 
 
        [Kasyer] bought larger equipment at the behest of 
       RPS and took on that financial responsibility, but when 
       his performance was unsatisfactory, he only received 
       verbal warnings until the point of ter mination which of 
       course, is written. He is aggressive with war ehouse 
       people in several locations to get in and out to serve 
       other . . . customers. When his own driver employees 
       were remiss, he replaced them once RPS brought a 
       problem to his attention. He was an aggr essive 
       business man in a very competitive environment. 
       Verbal warnings did not persuade him of RPS's serious 
       concerns. 
 
        Based on many years of dealing with industrial 
       relations jurisprudence in American business, Ifind 
       the RPS system lacking in due process towar d [Kayser]. 
 
        Here the RPS system, which I respect, blinds itself 
       into thinking - as long as we document our side of the 
       business arrangement, that is sufficient. For a 
       reputable business organization that per forms an 
       important service in the economy, that is inadequate. 
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Paragraph eight gives Mechmann's conclusion: 
 
        I conclude that this was wrongful ter mination by RPS 
       of the LCOA and determine the contractor's ear nings 
       (after payment of all expenses which are bor ne by 
       contractor) according to LCOA Section 9.3(e). As 
       Section 9.3(e) provides, the damage period her e runs 
       from 05/21/98, the date of RPS's termination of the 
       LCOA to 01/25/99, the normal date of ter mination of 
       the present Agreement (LCOA). 
 
Paragraph nine, without explanation, sets Kayser's 
damages at $174,431.15. Paragraphs ten, eleven, and 




RPS then filed suit, asking the District Court to vacate or 
modify the arbitrator's award.1 The District Court granted 
RPS's motion, holding that: (1) the FAA, not Pennsylvania 
law, supplied the standards for judicial r eview of the 
arbitrator's decision; and (2) the arbitrator had exceeded 
his authority under the contract. In light of this conclusion, 
the Court did not reach RPS's other prof fered bases for 
vacatur. Kayser appeals. We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review a district court's ruling 
on a motion to vacate an arbitration award de novo. See 
Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago Inc., 19 F .3d 1503, 1509 




We must first decide whether the District Court properly 
applied the FAA's vacatur standards or whether it should 
have, as Kayser submits, used those laid out in the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act (PUAA). For reasons 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act does not cr eate federal question 
jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). But because RPS is a Delaware corporation 
and Kayser is a citizen of New Jersey (and because the amount in 
controversy requirement is met in this case), the District Court had 
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. 
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we set forth in the margin, the answer to this question 
could be quite important to the ultimate disposition of this 
case.2 We have no tr ouble in determining that this case is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The FAA lists four circumstances where a court may grant vacatur 
and three under which it may correct or modify an award. Vacatur is 
governed by 9 U.S.C. S 10(a). It pr ovides that a court may vacate an 
award if: (1) it "was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," id. 
S 10(a)(1); (2) the arbitrator was "partial[ ] or corrupt[ ]," id.S 
10(a)(2); (3) 
the arbitrator unjustifiably refused to postpone the hearing, refused to 
consider "evidence pertinent and material to the controversy," or engaged 
in any other "misbehavior" that prejudiced the rights of a party, id. 
S 10(a)(3); or (4) the arbitrator "exceeded[his or her] powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon 
the subject matter submitted was not made," id. S 10(a)(4). Some courts, 
including this one, have also recognized additional, nonstatutory bases 
upon which a reviewing court may vacate an arbitrator's award under 
the FAA. See generally Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No. 1269, 896 
F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1990) (r ecognizing that an award may be set aside 
if it displays "manifest disregard for the law"); Swift Indus., Inc. v. 
Botany 
Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir . 1972) (noting that an 
arbitrator's award must meet the test of fundamental rationality). 
Correction and modification under the FAA are covered in 9 U.S.C. S 11, 
which empowers courts to act: "(a) Where there was an evident material 
miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the 
description of any person, thing, or property r eferred to in the award[; 
or] 
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to 
them . . . ." 
 
Pennsylvania arbitration law is governed by the PUAA, which sets forth 
two discrete regimes. The first is known as "statutory arbitration," under 
which the standards for vacatur, modification, and correction parallel 
almost perfectly those of the FAA. Compare 42 Pa. Con. Stat. S 7314(a) 
(governing vacatur), and id. S 7315(a) (covering modification and 
correction), with 9 U.S.C. S 10(a)(vacatur) and id. S 11 (modificationand 
correction). The second regime is known as"common law arbitration." 
Judicial power to set aside common law arbitration awards is sharply 
circumscribed. See 42 Pa. Con. Stat.S 7341 (stating that such awards 
"may not be vacated or modified unless it is clearly shown that a party 
was denied a hearing or that fraud, misconduct, corruption or other 
irregularity caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or 
unconscionable award"). The PUAA provides that an agreement to 
arbitrate "shall be conclusively presumed" to be a common law 
arbitration "unless the agreement to arbitrate is in writing and expressly 
provides for" statutory arbitration pursuant to the relevant statutory 
chapter. Id. S 7302(a). Neither the LCOA's arbitration clause nor its 
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governed by the FAA. Subject to a few exceptions not 
implicated here, the statute applies to any"written 
provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
arising out of such contract or transaction." 9 U.S.C. S 2. 
This language "extend[s] the Act's r each to the limits of the 
Congress' Commerce Clause power[.]" Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995). The 
agreement to arbitrate in this case--one between citizens of 
different states and involving a contract for the delivery and 
pick-up of packages that have been or will be shipped 
interstate--was unquestionably within Congr ess' power to 
reach under the Commerce Clause. 
 
Our inquiry is not ended, however, simply because we 
have concluded that the FAA applies. Congr ess enacted the 
FAA "to overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to 
arbitrate." Id. at 270. The statute's ultimate purpose is to 
enforce the terms of private arbitration agreements. See 9 
U.S.C. S 2 (providing that such agr eements "shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon gr ounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"); see 
also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd , 470 U.S. 213, 220 
(1985) (observing that the statute "was motivated, first and 
foremost, by a congressional desir e to enforce agreements 
into which parties had entered"). Though the FAA generally 
embraces a "proarbitration policy," this policy "does not 
operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting 
parties." Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 
U.S. 52, 57 (1995). Thus, if parties contract to arbitrate 
pursuant to arbitration rules or procedur es borrowed from 
state law, the federal policy is satisfied so long as their 
agreement is enforced. See Volt Info. Sci., Inc., v. Board of 




choice of law clause mentions the PUAA (much less a particular chapter), 
so this would be a common law arbitration if Pennsylvania standards 
apply. And because the PUAA's vacatur standar ds for common law 
arbitration awards are so much narr ower than the FAA's, the choice of 
standards issue could well be dispositive in this case. 
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The foregoing does not mean that agreements specifying 
that arbitration will be conducted pursuant to state rules or 
procedures cease being subject to the F AA; it means simply 
that the FAA permits parties to "specify by contract the 
rules under which . . . arbitration will be conducted." Id. at 
479. When a court enforces the terms of an arbitration 
agreement that incorporates state law rules, it does so not 
because the parties have chosen to be governed by state 
rather than federal law. Rather, it does so because federal 
law requires that the court enfor ce the terms of the 
agreement. Cf. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58 (inquiring 
"what the contract has to say about the arbitrability of 
petitioner's claim for punitive damages" rather than 
whether the agreement was controlled by a New York rule 
barring arbitrators from awarding them). 
 
Having previously reserved the thr eshold question, see 
Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 F .2d 1089, 1094- 
95 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1987), we now hold that parties may 
agree that judicial review of an arbitrator's decision will be 
conducted according to standards borr owed from state law. 
The FAA creates "a substantive rule applicable in state as 
well as federal courts," Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 
1, 16 (1984), but Volt and Mastr obuono clarified that its rule 
is simply that courts must enforce the ter ms of arbitration 
agreements. We now join with the gr eat weight of authority 
and hold that parties may opt out of the FAA's off-the-rack 
vacatur standards and fashion their own (including by 
referencing state law standards). 3 This holding makes it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See, e.g., Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 
452245, at *6-7 (4th Cir., Aug. 11, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished 
opinion); Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI T elecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996- 
97 (5th Cir. 1995); M & L Power Servs., Inc. v. American Network Int'l, 44 
F. Supp. 2d 134, 141 (D.R.I. 1999); New England Util. v. Hydro-Quebec, 
10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 63 (D. Mass. 1998); Flexible Mfg. Sys. v. Super Prods. 
Corp., 874 F. Supp. 247, 248-49 (E.D. W is. 1994); Flight Sys. v. Paul A. 
Laurence Co., 715 F. Supp. 1125, 1127-28 (D.D.C. 1989). But see UHC 
Management Co. v. Computer Science Corp., 148 F .3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 
1998) ("It is not clear . . . that parties have any say in how a federal 
court will review an arbitration award when Congress has ordained a 
specific, self-limiting procedure for how such review is to occur."). 
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necessary for us to decide a truly difficult question-- 




We first consider whether RPS and Kayser manifested a 
clear intent that any judicial review of the arbitrator's 
award would be conducted pursuant to standar ds borrowed 
from Pennsylvania law. Though our ultimate goal is to 
effectuate their intent, we have little evidence with which to 
work. Section 9.3 of the LCOA binds them to r esolve any 
disputes "by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association." 
Section 16 directs that the LCOA "shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." The LCOA itself says 
nothing about the issue before us, and ther e is no extrinsic 
evidence that RPS and Kayser gave the matter any 
consideration. All we have to guide us, ther efore, is an 
arbitration clause and a generic choice-of-law clause. 
 
We do not believe that provisions such as these 
demonstrate a clear intent to displace the F AA's vacatur 
standards and replace them with ones borr owed from 
Pennsylvania law. Choice-of-law clauses are ubiquitous in 
commercial agreements, and with good r eason. Contract 
law is mostly state law, and it varies from state to state. As 
a result, parties to commercial agr eements often care a 
great deal about which state's law will gover n their 
association. And because modern choice-of-law doctrines 
tend to place great weight on intent, contracting parties 
have an incentive to include choice-of-law clauses in their 
agreements. Commercial parties often also bargain for 
arbitration clauses, hoping to benefit from arbitration's 
purported advantages over litigation. As a r esult, many 
commercial contracts include both choice-of-law and 
arbitration clauses. 
 
When required to determine the legal standards 
governing a particular controversy, courts typically confront 
two choice-of-law questions. The first is the horizontal 
question: whether the laws of State X or State Y supply the 
relevant rule of decision. Choice-of-law doctrines (and, 
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consequently, choice-of-law clauses) speak to this issue. 
The second choice-of-law question that courts face is the 
vertical one: whether the rule of decision is supplied by the 
laws of State X or by federal law. Judge-made choice-of-law 
doctrines (and, accordingly, attempts by contracting parties 
to influence their application with choice-of-law clauses) 
have no applicability to answering this question because 
the relevant rule is supplied by the Constitution itself: a 
valid federal law preempts any state law purporting to 
regulate the same issue. See U.S. Const. Art. VI. 
 
The issue before us, however, is not one of choice-of-law 
or preemption--it is simply a matter of contract 
construction. No one contests that were this matter 
governed by state law, then the relevant rule would be 
supplied by the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
But, as we have explained, this case is not governed by 
state law--it is governed by federal law. The only reason we 
must decide whether to apply federal or state standards in 
this case is because the FAA permits parties to "specify by 
contract the rules under which . . . arbitration will be 
conducted." Volt, 489 U.S. at 479. The issue in this case is 
whether the LCOA's generic choice-of-law clause should be 
read as specifying that any judicial review of the arbitrator's 
decision should be conducted according to the standards 
set forth in Pennsylvania arbitration law instead of those 
set out in the FAA. 
 
We decline to construe the choice-of-law clause in this 
case as evidencing a clear intent to incorporate 
Pennsylvania's standards for judicial r eview into the LCOA. 
As we explained above, choice-of-law clauses ar e generally 
intended to speak to an issue wholly distinct fr om the one 
with which we are currently faced. Mor eover, because few (if 
any) federal statutes other than the FAA even permit parties 
to opt out of the standards contained in them, we are 
confident that this particular issue rarely occurs to 
contracting parties ex ante. 
 
We find support for our conclusion in Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), which 
involved a dispute between a securities broker and two of 
its customers. The parties had agreed to r esolve any 
disputes by arbitration and had indicated a desir e to have 
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their agreement "governed by the laws of the State of New 
York." Though the FAA permits arbitrators to award 
punitive damages, the question before the Supr eme Court 
was whether the parties had intended to incorporate into 
their agreement a New York rule that barred arbitrators 
from awarding them. 
 
The Court began by examining the choice-of-law clause 
"in isolation." Id. at 59. It noted that the clause could 
"reasonably be read as merely a substitute for the conflict- 
of-laws analysis that otherwise would determine what law 
to apply to disputes arising out of the contractual 
relationship," id., i.e., whether to apply the laws of New 
York or those of another state. If this r eading was the 
correct one, the Court observed, then "ther e would be 
nothing in the contract that could possibly constitute 
evidence of an intent to exclude punitive damages claims." 
Id. The Court also stated that even if the choice-of-law 
clause was intended to be "more than a substitute for 
ordinary conflict-of-laws analysis" it still "might not 
preclude the award of punitive damages because New York 
allows its courts, though not its arbitrators, to enter such 
awards." Id. Because of this, the Court reasoned that "the 
provision might include only New York's substantive rights 
and obligations and, not the State's allocation of power 
between alternative tribunals." Id. at 60. 
 
Though never resolving which interpretation of the 
choice-of-law clause was the best one, the Court squarely 
held that it did not clearly evidence an intent to opt out of 
the federal default rule that arbitrators may awar d punitive 
damages and replace it with one borrowed from New York 
law that they may not award them. See id.  (remarking that 
the choice-of-law clause was "not, in itself, an unequivocal 
exclusion of punitive damages claims"); see also id. at 62 
("At most, the choice-of-law clause intr oduces an ambiguity 
into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow 
punitive damages awards." (emphasis added)). Mastrobuono 
thus supports our conclusion that the LCOA evidences no 
clear intent to displace the FAA's default standards for 
judicial review and to replace them with those borrowed 
from Pennsylvania law. 
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Our conclusion that RPS and Kayser have expr essed no 
clear intent as to whether the District Court should have 
applied federal or state vacatur standards is not 
undermined by Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of 
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 
(1989). In that case, the underlying contract included both 
an arbitration clause and a choice-of-law clause. See id. at 
470. A California court interpreted the contract to mean 
that the parties had intended to incorporate California's 
arbitration rules into their agreement, see id. at 471-73, 
and the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. 
Though the contractor "devote[d] the bulk of its argument 
to convincing [the Supreme Court] that the [California court 
had] erred in interpreting the choice-of-law clause," it 
stressed that "the interpretation of private contracts is 
ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not 
sit to review." Id. at 474 (emphasis added). The Court 
acknowledged that it might have needed to review the state 
courts' interpretation had that interpr etation infringed 
upon federal rights, but explained that the only"right" 
conferred by the FAA is to have private arbitration 
agreements enforced according to their terms. See id. at 
474-76. And, said the Court, because the Califor nia courts 
had found that the parties meant to incorporate the 
California rules into their agreement, applying those rules to 
their case was perfectly consistent with the policies of the 
FAA. See id. at 475. 
 
We do not view Volt as of fering guidance as to how 
generic choice-of-law clauses should be interpreted; rather, 
the Court merely followed its obligation to defer to state 
court constructions of private agreements in cases where 
no federal rights are at stake. This supposition is supported 
by Mastrobuono, where the Court was reviewing a federal 
court's construction of a choice-of-law clause. Responding 
to Justice Thomas's dissent, which relied heavily on Volt, 
the Court clarified that in that case it had not construed 
the contract de novo. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 60 n.4. 
Instead, said the Court, it had "deferred to the California 
court's construction of its own State's law." Id. 
 
Our understanding of Volt is bolster ed by case law from 
our sister circuits. Six other Courts of Appeals have 
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expressly considered the relationship between Volt and 
Mastrobuono. All six have unanimously concluded that Volt 
is inapposite when a federal court is unconstrained by the 
need to defer to state court constructions. See Painewebber, 
Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 594 n.5 (1st Cir. 1996); National 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 
134 (2d Cir. 1996); Porter Hayden Co. v. Century Indemnity 
Co., 136 F.3d 380, 383 n.6 (4th Cir . 1998); Ferro Corp. v. 
Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 936 (6th Cir. 1998); 
UHC Management Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences Corp. , 148 
F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1998); W olsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, 
Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 1998).4 Volt therefore 
contains nothing that undercuts our conclusion that RPS 
and Kayser expressed no clear intent to incorporate 





Because the presence of a generic choice-of-law clause 
tells us little (if anything) about whether contracting parties 
intended to opt out of the FAA's default standards and 
incorporate ones borrowed from state law, we need to 
establish a default rule, and the one we adopt is that a 
generic choice-of-law clause, standing alone, is insufficient 
to support a finding that contracting parties intended to opt 
out of the FAA's default standards. W e first lay out three 
considerations that inform our analysis, articulate why the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We acknowledge that there ar e decisions to the contrary, but we find 
them to be of little value. Many of the cases wer e decided before 
Mastrobuono clarified the meaning of Volt. See Barbier v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir . 1991); Flexible Mfg. Sys. 
Ltd., 
v. Super Prod. Corp., 874 F. Supp. 247 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Flight Sys. v. 
Paul A. Laurence Co., 715 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989); Smith Barney, 
Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y .S.2d 193 (1995); Thomson 
McKinnon Secur., Inc. v. Cucchiella, 594 N.E.2d 870 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1992). Other decisions, though decided after Mastrobuono, never so 
much as cite the decision and tend to focus on pr eemption rather than 
contract construction. See ASW Allstate Painting & Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Lexington Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 1999); Ekstrom v. Value Health, 
Inc., 68 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995); M & L Power Servs, Inc. v. American 
Networks Int'l, 44 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.R.I. 1999). 
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rule we announce today is consistent with them, and show 
why our rule is in line with case law from both the 
Supreme Court and six of our sister cir cuits. We then 
respond to the alternative approach proposed by Judge 




Three considerations guide us in formulating a default 
rule. First, we aim to minimize the frequency with which 
parties will be found to have opted out of the F AA's default 
regime when they did not intend to do so. This guidepost is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that the 
FAA standards control "in the absence of contractual intent 
to the contrary." Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 59. It is also 
consonant with the FAA's raison d'etr e, which is to 
overcome rules (whether created by state legislatures or by 
courts) that make it more difficult to enforce arbitration 
agreements. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 ("The FAA was 
designed `to overrule the judiciary's long-standing refusal to 
enforce agreements to arbitrate.' ") (quoting Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)). We 
acknowledge that some states provide as much or more 
protection to arbitration agreements than does the FAA, 
see, e.g., 42 Pa. Con. Stat. S 7302 et seq, but others do not, 
see, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 
(1976) (construing New York law as pr ecluding arbitrators 
from awarding punitive damages). The F AA's ultimate goal 
is to enforce parties' actual bargains, but any default rule 
is doomed to be inaccurate in some cases. We must, 
therefore, decide which error is worse: wrongly concluding 
that parties intended to opt out, or wrongly concluding that 
they did not. In light of the FAA's history, we believe that 
the former is worse than the latter. 
 
Second, we strive to create a regime under which it will 
be easy for arbitrators and district courts to deter mine 
whether parties have opted out of federal standar ds. 
Finally, we seek to create a rule that sophisticated parties 
may bargain around without significantly increasing their 
transaction costs. 
 
In light of these guideposts, we believe that the best rule 
is that a generic choice-of-law clause, standing alone, raises 
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no inference that contracting parties intended to opt out of 
the FAA's default regime. This rule will ensure that parties 
who have never thought about this particular issue--a 
characterization that, we suspect, would apply to the 
parties in this case--will not be found to have opted out. It 
will also make life easier for both arbitrators and judges 
because the analysis will be complete once they conclude 
that an agreement contains nothing more than a generic 
choice-of-law clause. In contrast, any other rule would 
often require a protracted analysis to determine whether 
the parties have contracted out of the default federal 
standards, a process that would impose two burdens: (1) it 
would make cases harder to decide for both arbitrators and 
judges; and (2) the resulting legal uncertainty might deter 
settlements. 
 
Lastly, the rule we announce will preserve and facilitate 
the ability of parties to contract around the default federal 
standards. Sophisticated parties (i.e., those who employ 
experienced lawyers to draft their contracts) will soon learn 
that a generic choice-of-law clause is not enough. Assuming 
that both parties genuinely wish to be gover ned by 
standards other than the FAA's, r equiring something more 
will impose minuscule transaction costs. It is not 
particularly difficult, for example, to pr ovide that "any 
controversy shall be settled by arbitration in accordance 
with the terms of the Pennsylvania Unifor m Arbitration 
Act." Cf. Ford v. Nyclare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., 
141 F.3d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that the parties' 
contract provided that "[a]ny contr oversy . . . shall be 
settled by arbitration in accordance with the T exas General 
Arbitration Act").5 We note also that any other rule would 
impose transaction costs as well by impelling parties not 
wishing to opt out to include a provision saying that their 




5. We do not mean to suggest that parties may not be found to have 
opted out unless their contract includes a statement such as this one. 
We hold only that a generic choice-of-law clause, standing alone, raises 
no such inference. The case might well be dif ferent if other contractual 
language or other evidence suggested that the parties intended to be 
bound by standards borrowed from state law. 
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Our rule is also consistent with the case law. First, it 
honors Mastrobuono's directive that FAA standards apply 
"in the absence of contractual intent to the contrary." 514 
U.S. at 59. As we have explained, there is good reason to 
believe that contracts often contain both generic choice-of- 
law and arbitration clauses in cases where it is likely that 
the parties gave absolutely no thought to opting out of the 
FAA's default standards. 
 
Second, the rule we announce today is in synch with  
Mastrobuono's holding. We acknowledge that that opinion 
concludes with a discussion that is premised on the 
assumption that the presence of a choice-of-law clause can 
render a contract ambiguous as to whether the parties 
intended to incorporate state arbitration rules into their 
agreement. See id. at 63-65. The Court, however, was 
careful to make clear that it was rendering no holding as to 
the meaning of the clause itself. See, e.g., id.  at 62 ("At 
most, the choice-of-law clause introduces an ambiguity into 
an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow 
punitive damages awards." (emphasis added)). 6 Third, our 
holding is in accord with decisions by six of our sister 
circuits that declined to construe a generic choice-of-law 
clause as raising an inference that the contracting parties 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. It is for this reason that Mastr obuono's invocation of contra 
proferentem to justify its decision is not inconsistent with the rule we 
announce here. The party that drafted the contract at issue in that case 
contended that it incorporated a New York rule that precluded 
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. Near the end of its opinion 
the Court stated that the drafter could not "over come the common-law 
rule of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous 
language against the interest of the party that drafted it." Id. at 62. 
But 
as we explained in the text, the Mastrobuono Court assumed without 
deciding that the agreement was ambiguous. Consequently, Judge 
Ambro is incorrect in arguing that, under Mastrobuono, "a generic 
choice-of-law provision not electing any specific law in the same 
agreement, is ambiguous." Ambr o Op. at 32 (emphasis added). Under our 
holding today, a generic choice-of-law clause is insufficient as a matter 
of law to show that the contracting parties intended to displace the FAA's 
default rules. As a result, the contract is not legally ambiguous, and 
contra proferentem is inapplicable. 
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Judge Ambro proposes a differ ent approach, arguing that 
contracts containing generic choice-of-law clauses and 
arbitration clauses should be construed as incorporating all 
state arbitration rules that are "pr ocedural" in nature and 
"substantive" state arbitration rules that do not "conflict" 
with the FAA. See Ambro Op. at 29-30. We are unconvinced, 
believing that the reasons outlined above that counsel in 
favor of the rule we announce today. Additionally, we have 
three problems with Judge Ambro's pr oposal. 
 
First, Judge Ambro's proposal is based on the false 
premise that we must find a way to "r econcile[ ]" Volt and 
Mastrobuono. Id. But as we explained, supra at Part III, the 
Supreme Court has already clarified the relationship 
between the two cases. In Volt, the Court followed its rule 
of deferring to state court interpretations of private 
contracts so long as no federal rights are at stake. The 
Court had no such obligation in Mastrobuono because that 
case (like this one) originated in federal court. See 
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 60 n.4; see also Volt, 489 U.S. 
474-76. Judge Ambro is apparently unconvinced by 
Mastrobuono's method of distinguishing Volt, see Ambro Op. 
at 27 & n.2, but whether we find Mastr obuono persuasive 
or not is of no moment. It is not the province of this Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See Painewebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 592, 594 (1st Cir. 1996); 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petr oleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 132, 
134-35 (2d Cir. 1996); Porter Hayden Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 136 
F.3d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1998); Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 
F.3d 926, 927-28, 937 (6th Cir. 1998); UHC Management Co., Inc. v. 
Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 994, 997 (8th Cir. 1998); Wolsey, 
Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1209,1212-13 (9th Cir. 1998). 
But see ASW Allstate Painting & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 
188 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (concluding otherwise); 
Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1394-96 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(same). We are unpersuaded by ASW and Ekstrom for a simple reason: 
neither opinion gives any reasons for concluding that a generic choice- 
of-law clause should be read as evidencing an intent to opt out of the 
FAA's default regime. 
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to craft a rule based on an assumption that the Supr eme 
Court was wrong or that it could not have meant what it 
said. As we noted earlier, numerous cases have examined 
the interrelationship between Volt  and Mastrobuono. See 
supra pp. 14-15 & n.5. We have not located, nor has Judge 
Ambro cited, a single case that "reconciled" the Court's two 
opinions on the basis proposed by Judge Ambr o. 
 
The second reason for our disagreement with Judge 
Ambro's proposal is that we believe that it would not 
effectively advance its stated purpose of ef fectuating the 
intent of most contracting parties. Judge Ambr o concludes 
his concurrence by arguing that "custom and practice 
among contract drafters" counsel in favor of construing 
contracts such as this one as incorporating arbitration 
standards borrowed from state law. Ambro Op. at 35. But 
that would not happen even under Judge Ambro's 
approach; rather, Judge Ambro's approach would have 
courts construe contracts like this one as incorporating all 
state arbitration rules that are "pr ocedural" in nature, but 
only those "substantive" rules that do not"conflict" with the 
FAA. Though reasonable people may quarr el over whether 
most parties to contracts such as the one befor e us would 
wish to be bound by the FAA's default standar ds or would 
instead choose to be bound by standards borr owed from 
state law, we think it most unlikely that any sizeable 
number of parties would wish to be bound by some federal 
standards and some state ones. 
 
Lastly, we believe that Judge Ambro's pr oposal would 
unduly complicate the law in this area. Under Judge 
Ambro's approach, arbitrators and courts seeking to 
determine whether a given rule was supplied by the FAA or 
was instead borrowed from state law wouldfirst need to 
classify the relevant rule as being either"substantive" or 
"procedural" for purposes of the F AA.8 It is possible that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although Judge Ambro cites two Pennsylvania cases for the 
proposition that standards of review are procedural, we think that this 
would have to be a question of federal law. Judge Ambro's view is that 
a generic choice-of-law clause incorporates all of the chosen state's 
arbitration law except those portions whose incorporation would be 
inconsistent with federal law, i.e., substantive rules that "conflict" 
with 
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arbitrators and courts would simply import the distinctions 
that have been drawn in the diversity context pursuant to 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), but the 
jurisprudence in that area is not always a model of clarity, 
and, at all events, we do not understand why distinctions 
drawn in a totally different context would necessarily 
transfer well to the FAA. 
 
The problematic nature of Judge Ambr o's proposal would 
only increase in any case where the party seeking vacatur 
complained about multiple issues, at least one of which 
was "procedural" and at least one of which "substantive" 
(however those terms are defined). In such a case, a 
reviewing court could be required to apply some rules 
borrowed from state law (i.e., "pr ocedural" rules and the 
relevant state's "substantive" rules that do not conflict with 
the FAA) and some rules taken from the F AA (i.e., 
"substantive" rules where the rule fr om the relevant state is 
in "conflict" with the FAA). Issues involving vacatur are 
difficult enough without the additional challenge of 
balancing and applying multiple legal regimes within the 
same case. For all of these reasons, we decline to adopt 




Applying our rule to the facts of this case yields an 
simple answer. The LCOA contains only a generic choice-of- 
law clause and there is no extrinsic evidence of an intent to 
contract out of the FAA's default regime. We therefore hold 
that the District Court was correct in concluding that the 
FAA standards of review govern this case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the FAA. As a consequence, under the r egime proposed by Judge Ambro, 
the categorization of a given rule as "substantive" or "procedural" would 
in large part determine whether it was preempted by the FAA. In our 
view, because the scope of the preemptive ef fect of a federal statute is 
itself a question of federal law, the question whether a given rule was 
"substantive" or "procedural" for purposes of the FAA would likewise be 
a question of federal law. 
 




Applying the FAA standards, we agr ee with the District 
Court that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his 
authority. Though judicial review under the F AA is 
"narrowly circumscribed," Local 863 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. Jersey Coast Egg Producers, Inc., 773 F.2d 530, 533 (3d 
Cir. 1985), the scope of an arbitrator's authority is defined 
and confined by the agreement to arbitrate, see, e.g., Swift 
Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F .2d 1125, 1131 (3d 
Cir. 1972). Accordingly, the FAA provides that a court "may 
make an order vacating [an] award . . . [w]here the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers." 9 U.S.C.S 10(a)(4). 
 
It is undisputed that the only issue presented to the 
arbitrator was whether RPS's "termination of [Kayser] was 
within the terms of [the LCOA]." The District Court found 
that the arbitrator exceeded his powers, and it is manifest 
that the court's conclusion was based on the text of the 
arbitrator's written decision, the relevant portions of which 
are set out in pages 6-7 of this opinion. The court noted 
that the arbitrator had "fram[ed] the issue as one of 
wrongful or proper termination" and then "proceed[ed] to 
discuss the inadequacy of RPS' procedur e for warning 
independent contractors of performance deficiencies and 
finally conclude[d] that `the RPS system[is] lacking in due 
process toward the Claimant contractor .' " Dist. Ct. Op. at 
14 (quoting Arb. Op.). The court str essed that "[t]he 
arbitration provision clearly limits the arbitrator's authority 
to decide only whether the termination was within the 
terms of the Agreement, not to examine the fairness of the 
extrinsic procedures by which RPS notifies contractors of 
problems." Id. It concluded that"[b]y grounding his 
decision on such considerations of fairness and thereby 
altering the Agreement to require certain pre-termination 
procedures, the arbitrator overstepped the bounds of the 
authority granted to him by the Agreement." Id. at 14-15. 
On appeal, RPS essentially adopts the District Court's 
analysis. 
 
Kayser advances three arguments in r esponse. He rightly 
notes that Mechmann was not required to justify or 
rationalize his decision. See Local 863, 773 F.2d at 534. He 
also correctly observes that the arbitrator was entitled to 
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make suggestions that went beyond the scope of his 
authority to decide. See Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. 
Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir . 1987). Finally, 
though acknowledging that the arbitrator made "r eference 
to due process issues," Kayser stresses the eighth 
paragraph of Mechmann's decision, which states:"I 
conclude that this was a wrongful termination by RPS of 
the LCOA." Kayser argues that Mechmann did not, "in the 
final analysis, tie his reference to the due process issues 
into his decision." Instead, Kayser claims, "the reference to 
due process [was] simply surplus, [was] irrelevant to Mr. 
Mechmann's decision and should not have been used as a 
basis by the court to suggest that the Arbitrator went 
beyond his authority." Appellant's Br . at 14-15. 
 
Before parsing the arbitrator's opinion to determine 
whether he exceeded his authority, we must first confront 
the question whether it is proper to do so. Kayser does not 
argue that courts are barred fr om examining an arbitrator's 
statement of reasons, and, at all events, such a contention 
would be contrary to our cases. See United States Steel & 
Carnegie Pension Fund v. McSkimming, 759 F .2d 269, 271 
(3d Cir. 1985) (vacating an arbitrator's awar d that ordered 
the payment of pension benefits where an examination of 
the arbitrator's written decision convinced the Court that 
"the arbitrator's award [was] patently based on statutory 
interpretation rather than the Plan"); see also Pennsylvania 
Power Co. v. Local Union #272 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, 886 F.2d 46, 49 (3d Cir . 1989) (concluding that a 
particular dispute was not arbitrable and remarking that 
"[n]othing in the arbitrator's two rulings convinces us to the 
contrary" because the opinions revealed that the arbitrator 
had based his decision "on the general desirability of 
arbitration" rather than the language of the agr eement). 
 
On the other hand, we have also cautioned against 
exploiting "an ambiguity" in an arbitrator's decision to 
support "an inference" that he or she exceeded his or her 
authority. NF&M Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 524 
F.2d 756, 759 (3d Cir. 1975). The r eason for this policy is 
that "[t]o require opinions fr ee of ambiguity [could] lead 
arbitrators to play it safe by writing no supporting opinions. 
This would be undesirable, for a well-reasoned opinion 
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tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process 
and aids in clarifying the underlying agreement." United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. , 363 
U.S. 593, 598 (1960). 
 
We distill the following principles fr om our precedents: (1) 
a reviewing court should presume that an arbitrator acted 
within the scope of his or her authority; (2) this 
presumption may not be rebutted by an ambiguity in a 
written opinion; but (3) a court may conclude that an 
arbitrator exceeded his or her authority when it is obvious 
from the written opinion. 
 
Under these standards, we hold that the District Court 
was correct in concluding that Mechmann exceeded his 
authority. Although Mechmann's opinion begins by 
acknowledging that his authority is set forth in Section 
9.3(e) of the LCOA, it contains only four paragraphs of 
substantive discussion--all of which focus on the way in 
which RPS communicated to Kayser that it was dissatisfied 
with his performance. See supra page 6. The conclusion 
that arbitrator Mechmann derived from this discussion was 
not that Kayser's termination had been contrary to the 
LCOA (the question actually before him), but rather that 
"the RPS system [was] lacking in due pr ocess toward 
[Kayser]." Kayser would have us believe that the arbitrator 
devoted four paragraphs to "mere dicta," but not one 
sentence to explaining his supposed "holding" that the 
termination violated the terms of the agreement. That 
reading is simply not supported by the arbitrator's opinion, 
which demonstrates, beyond peradventure, that Mechmann 
ruled on an issue that was not properly befor e him. 
 
Moreover, as noted by RPS, the arbitrator never framed 
or decided the issue in the terms stated by the LCOA: 
"[W]hether the termination of [Kayser] was within the terms 
of this Agreement." Instead, Mechmann stated that "[t]he 
main question" was whether "the termination" was 
"wrongful or proper." And Mechmann's "conclu[sion]" was 
"that this was wrongful termination by RPS of the LCOA," 
not that the termination violated "the ter ms of " the LCOA. 
Though these latter two references, standing alone, would 
not suffice to show that the arbitrator exceeded his 
authority, they lend further support to our conclusion that 
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he did so. We hold that the District Court was correct to 




9. Our affirmance of the District Court's vacatur order gives rise to a 
controversy as to whether Kayser may seek r earbitration. The FAA 
provides that "[w]here an awar d is vacated and the time within which the 
agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court 
may, in its discretion, direct a r ehearing by the arbitrators." 9 U.S.C. 
S 10(a). As our previous discussion indicates, the arbitrator's opinion is 
unclear as to whether he ruled on the issue that was before him: 
whether RPS's termination of Kayser's contract was within the terms of 
LCOA. Under these circumstances, rehearing would seem appropriate. 
But query whether "the time within which the agr eement required the 
award to be made has . . . expired." Though the LCOA itself sets no 
particular date by which an award must be enter ed, the parties agreed 
to "arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association [(AAA or Association)]." LCOA S 9.3. 
The question seems to be, therefore, whether AAA rules impose an outer 
time limit, and that may well be a matter better r esolved by the 
Association. We do not decide these difficult issues, which are not before 
us, but leave them for any further proceedings that may occur. 
 
If a rearbitration occurs in this matter , we note for guidance that all 
members of the panel are in agreement that, at all events, the 
arbitrator's award should have been reduced to no more than 
$129,930.00--the amount Kayser originally sought to compensate him 
for his "lost profits." According to Section 9.3(e) of the LCOA, Kayser 
was 
entitled to damages only for his "net ear nings . . . during the period 
between the date of termination to the last day of the term of this 
Agreement." As noted in the text, Kayser originally sought $141,961.40 
($129,930.00 in lost profits and $12,031.40 for purchasing a truck at 
the behest of RPS), but the arbitrator awarded him $174,431.15. We are 
satisfied that the truck purchase was plainly outside the scope of 
allowable damages and can find no support in the r ecord for the 
arbitrator's award of $32,469.75 mor e than Kayser originally requested. 
That being said, the panel expresses no opinion as to whether an award 
of $129,930.00 was justified in this case. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
I concur in the outcome reached by my colleagues. I 
agree that the arbitrator in this case exceeded his authority 
in making the award in favor of Mr. Kayser against 
Roadway Package System, Inc. ("RPS"). In arriving at this 
result, I agree that the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), 
9 U.S.C. S 1 et seq., permits parties by private agreement to 
contract around the FAA's standar ds by which arbitrators' 
awards are vacated. I also agree that whether the parties 
have contracted out of the FAA's vacatur of awards 
standard is a matter of contract construction. 1 But I 
disagree with my colleagues' conclusion that, as a matter of 
contract construction, the parties' choice of Pennsylvania 
law to govern the Linehaul Contractor Operating Agreement 
(the "LCOA") requires that the F AA, and not Pennsylvania 
law, provide the standard of judicial r eview to be applied to 
that contract's arbitration provision (which makes no 
mention of a governing law). In determining that the FAA 
requires that the LCOA contain a "clear intent" to have 
Pennsylvania law govern its arbitration pr ovision, or else by 
default the FAA applies, my colleagues, I believe, misapply 
our Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), and disregard 
custom and practice among the drafters of agr eements. 
 
A. The FAA 
 
The issue of the FAA's preemption of state arbitration law 
is a subject of considerable debate. See, e.g. , id. at 52, 56; 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989); Maj. Op. at 15 n.4. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. My colleagues use "contract construction" instead of "contract 
interpretation," and I presume they do so deliberately. Under contract 
construction a court construes the effect of an agreement under 
applicable law. Contract interpretation is the attempt by a court to 
ascertain the intent of the parties to an agr eement by the words they use 
to express that agreement. The for mer is a matter of law, the latter one 
of fact. See John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 
659-60 (3d Cir. 1986); Ram Const. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 
1049, 1052-53 (3d Cir. 1984); see generally Edwin W. Patterson, The 
Interpretation and Construction of Contracts , 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 835 
(1964); 3 Corbin on Contracts S 534, at 9 (1960). 
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Interestingly, the FAA was enacted in 1925 for the purpose 
of "overcom[ing] courts' refusals to enforce agreements to 
arbitrate." Allied--Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 
265, 270 (1995). But this obvious pro-arbitration policy 
does not operate without regard to the intent of the parties 
to an agreement to arbitrate. Parties may choose that their 
arbitration be governed by rules other than those supplied 
by the FAA, Volt, 489 U.S. at 479, and the FAA "simply 
requires courts to enforce [those] privately negotiated 
agreements . . . in accordance with their terms." Id. at 478. 
 
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence--Volt and 
       Mastrobuono 
 
Our Supreme Court has twice within the last twelve years 
dealt with the deceptively difficult issue of whether the FAA 
impliedly governs an agreement to arbitrate within a 
contract specifically chosen by the parties to be governed 
by state law. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 52; Volt, 489 
U.S. at 468. In Volt, the Supr eme Court held that the FAA 
did not preempt a contract's super-generic2 choice of "the 
law of the place where the Project is located" (in that case, 
California). Ruling that "where the parties have agreed that 
their arbitration agreement will be gover ned by the law of 
California," a California court, pursuant to its state 
arbitration law, could stay the arbitration pending the 
results of related litigation involving third parties, 
something the FAA does not contemplate and thus would 
not permit if it governed. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470. "Where, as 
here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of 
arbitration, enforcing those rules accor ding to the terms of 
the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, 
even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the 
[FAA] would otherwise permit it to go forward." Id. at 479. 
That is because "[a]rbitration under the[FAA] is a matter of 
consent, not coercion." Id. Understood this way, where 
parties have a generic choice-of-law provision governing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. My colleagues refer to a generic choice of law as an agreement that 
states that it will be governed by the laws of a particular jurisdiction 
(in 
this case, Pennsylvania). In Volt, no particular jurisdiction was listed 
in 
the agreement under review. Thus, if our case involves a generic choice 
of law, Volt pertains to a super-generic choice of law. 
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their contract, they must affirmatively choose to have their 
agreement to arbitrate governed by the FAA. The only 
exception would be if the state rule chosen "would 
undermine the goals and policies of the FAA." Id. at 478. 
 
Mastrobuono, decided only six years after Volt, held, in 
the context of a form contract containing a generic New 
York choice-of-law provision and a separate arbitration 
provision, that the FAA (which per mitted punitive damages 
awards by arbitrators) preempted New York law (which did 
not). The Supreme Court determined that New York law 
would govern substantive principles of the agr eement but 
could not provide, by the use of generic choice-of-law 
language alone, "special rules limiting the authority of the 
arbitrator." Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64. Mastrobuono did 
not purport to reverse or even limit Volt. Instead, the Court 
distinguished Volt in a footnote: 
 
       In Volt . . . we deferred to the California court's 
       construction of its own state's law . . . . In the present 
       case, by contrast, we review a federal court's 
       interpretation of this contract, and our interpretation 
       accords with that of the only decision-maker ar guably 
       entitled to deference--the arbitrator .3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Ironically, the Supreme Court pointed out in Mastrobuono that it 
would decide the case "the same under either a de novo or a deferential 
standard." Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 55 n.1. Moreover, Mastrobuono's 
effort to distinguish Volt has received strong criticism. See Thomas A. 
Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive Effect on the 
Federal Arbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 
Ariz. 
L. Rev. 35, 56-58 (1997) ("This would suggest that Mastrobuono is 
applicable only when the choice of law clause's intended meaning is 
resolved in federal court. State courts would r emain free to ignore 
Mastrobuono while federal courts would be obligated to honor it. When 
the Supreme Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating [465 U.S. 1 
(1984)] that the provisions of the FAA must be honored by state courts 
as well as federal courts, it did so to assur e uniformity of law 
irrespective 
of the selected forum. To hold otherwise would`encourage and reward 
forum shopping. . . . Furthermore, the Court's premise that a state 
court's interpretation of a choice of law clause is entitled to deference 
while a federal court's interpretation is subject to de novo review is 
insupportable.") (citations omitted); see also Heather J. Haase, Note, In 
Defense of Parties' Rights to Limit Arbitral Awards Under the Federal 
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Id. at 60 n.4. 
 
Underlying the Court's decision in Mastrobuono is that 
"the wishes of the contracting parties" prevail, id. at 57 
(citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 468), even if those wishes 
contravene the FAA by "an unequivocal exclusion of 
punitive damages claims." Id. at 60. In ascertaining those 
wishes, Mastrobuono instructs a court to take into account 
three principles of contract construction and interpretation. 
The first (which is in line with Volt , 489 U.S. at 478) is that 
the application of the law chosen would not under mine 
(absent express agreement) the goals and policies of the 
FAA. Id. at 56 ("New York's prohibition against arbitral 
awards of punitive damages . . . is a vestige of the `ancient' 
judicial hostility to arbitration."). The second principle is 
that, by placing in its contract a generic choice of law and 
an arbitration provision without a specific choice of law, 
Shearson Lehman "drafted an ambiguous contract, and . . . 
cannot now claim the benefit of the doubt." Id. at 63. 
Finally, "a document should be read to give effect to all its 
provisions and to render them consistent with each other." 
Id. Each of these principles is discussed below in the 
context of this case. 
 
The difference between Volt  and Mastrobuono, "while 
there, is difficult to grasp." Lanier v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 
936 F. Supp. 839, 844 (M.D. Ala. 1996). But these cases 
can, I believe, be reconciled. Taken together, they require 
that a substantive state arbitration rule (such as New 
York's barring of arbitrators awarding punitive damages) is 
superseded by the FAA where ther e is a conflict between 
the FAA and the state rule, though even that conflict can be 
overcome if dealt with explicitly in the contract. On the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Arbitration Act: Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 31 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 309, 331-32 (1996) ("Although purporting to follow Volt, 
the Supreme Court has ignored its own mandate in Volt to enforce 
`contractual rights and expectations of the parties,' and has instead 
distorted the meaning of the federal policy in or der to reach the 
conclusion that punitive damages should be allowed in arbitration.") 
(citations omitted); Joshua M. Barrett, Note, Federal Arbitration Policy 
After Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 32 Willamette L. 
Rev. 517, 534 (1996). 
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other hand, the FAA defers to procedural state arbitration 
rules (such as the California rule delaying an arbitration 
pending resolution of another matter in litigation), even 
when the FAA is in conflict. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 
63-64 ("We think that the best way to har monize the 
choice-of-law provision with the arbitration pr ovision is to 
read `the laws of the State of New York' [in the choice-of-law 
provision] to encompass substantive principles that New 
York courts would apply, but not to include special rules 
limiting the authority of arbitrators."); Volt, 989 U.S. at 479 
("Where, as here, the parties have agr eed to abide by state 
rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the 
terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of 
the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed 
where the [FAA] would otherwise permit it to go forward."); 
Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their 
Preemptive Effect on the Federal Arbitration Act: Reconciling 
the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 35, 60-65 
(1997) (hereinafter "Diamond"). 
 
C. Our Case 
 
Applied to our case, the issue is this: in a contract 
containing an arbitration provision making no mention of 
the FAA, is the affirmative choice of Pennsylvania law in a 
general choice-of-law clause enough to govern that entire 
contract, or does the FAA further require that the 
arbitration section of that contract explicitly choose 
Pennsylvania law again for its (and not the FAA's) 
arbitration procedures to apply? More specifically, the 
conflict is whether the FAA or the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Arbitration Act (the "PUAA")4 governs the parties' 
arbitration. This issue is easily resolved in favor of the 
PUAA if only Volt applies. But Mastrobuono creates the 
complexity. Consequently, I analyze our issue based on my 
reading of the principles of Volt  and Mastrobuono. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Under the PUAA, three types of arbitration are provided: (1) statutory, 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 7301-7320; (2) common law, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
SS 7341-7342; and (3) judicial, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 7361-7362. My 
colleagues and I agree that common law arbitration would be applicable 
if Pennsylvania law were to apply. See Maj. Op. at 8-9 n.2. 
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       1. Application of the Principles of Volt and 
       Mastrobuono 
 
       a. Law Chosen to Govern LCOA (Pennsylvania) Does 
       Not Undermine FAA 
 
In applying Volt and Mastrobuono to our case, the initial 
question is whether the application of Pennsylvania law to 
the arbitration section of the LCOA undermines the FAA. 
This requires, in my view, preliminary consideration of 
whether vacating an arbitrator's award because the 
arbitrator exceeded his authority is procedural or 
substantive. If the former, the generic choice of 
Pennsylvania law to govern the LCOA means that the PUAA 
governs all aspects of arbitration. If substantive, we then 
must address whether the PUAA is in conflict with the FAA, 
for only then does the FAA preempt in our case. 
 
I believe that vacating an arbitrator's awar d because the 
arbitrator exceeded his authority is procedural, see Hade v. 
Nationwide Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 980, 982 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986), overruled on other grounds by Ostroff v. Keystone 
Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 584 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986) (" `Irregularity' 
refers not to the award itself, but to the process used in 
arriving at this award."); Diamond, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 62 & 
n.223, and thus the FAA defers to the generic choice of 
state law to govern such matters. But even if the vacatur of 
arbitrators' awards is substantive, Pennsylvania law is not 
in conflict with the FAA, for both the FAA and common law 
arbitration under the PUAA permit vacating or modifying 
arbitral awards in circumstances where the arbitrator 
exceeds his or her authority. Compare  9 U.S.C. S 10(a)(1) 
(allowing courts to vacate arbitrators' awards where 
"procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means"), and id. 
S 10(a)(4) (allowing vacatur where the arbitrator "exceeded 
[his or her] powers"), with 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 7341 
(authorizing vacatur where "fraud, misconduct, corruption 
or other irregularity caused . . . an unjust [or] inequitable 
. . . award") (emphasis added). An "irregularity" under 
Pennsylvania common law arbitration can include that the 
arbitrator considered issues beyond the scope of the 
arbitration clause. See Hade, 503 A.2d at 983 ("Admittedly, 
a finding that the panel considered an issue beyond the 
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scope of the arbitration clause would support a 
modification of the award on appeal."). Thus, unlike my 
colleagues, I do not believe that judicial power under 
Pennsylvania common law arbitration to vacate awar ds is 
"so much narrower than the FAA's" vacatur standards. Maj. 
Op. at 8-9 n.2. In any event, any differ ences that may exist 
do not determine the outcome of this case, and thus the 
PUAA does not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA 
in this instance. 
 
       b. LCOA Is Ambiguous and Must be Construed 
       Against its Drafter (RPS) 
 
Following the further teaching of Mastrobuono, a generic 
choice-of-law provision, coupled with an arbitration 
provision not electing any specific law in the same 
agreement, is ambiguous.5Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62-63. 
Under the rule of contra proferentum, drafters (such as 
Shearson Lehman in Mastrobuono) "cannot now claim the 
benefit of the doubt" with respect to that ambiguity. Id. at 
63. RPS is in the same boat rowing with the same oars. It 
alone drafted the LCOA and in it chose Pennsylvania law 
without mentioning the FAA in the arbitration section of 
that contract. It cannot now argue that what Mastrobuono 
found to be ambiguous should be interpreted in RPS's favor 
by applying the FAA to the vacatur of the arbitrator's 
award. 
 
My colleagues find, in disregard of Mastrobuono (and, I 
believe, counterintuitively), that the choice of Pennsylvania 
law in the LCOA, coupled with a general arbitration 
provision that does not select a set of state arbitration 
rules, is by default a "not legally ambiguous" choice of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. My colleagues conclude that Mastrobuono merely contains "a 
discussion that is premised on the assumption that the presence of a 
choice-of-law clause can render a contract ambiguous as to whether the 
parties intended to incorporate state arbitration rules into their 
agreement." Maj. Op. at 18; see also Maj. Op. at 18 n.6 ("[A]s we 
explained, the Mastrobuono Court assumed without deciding that the 
agreement was ambiguous."). What they ignor e is the following 
Shermanesque statement of Mastrobuono: "Respondents [Shearson 
Lehman, et al.] drafted an ambiguous document, and they cannot now 
claim the benefit of the doubt." Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63. 
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FAA to govern the arbitration section. Maj. Op. at 18 n.6. 
But even their own words belie this conclusion. 
 
       Because the presence of a generic choice-of-law clause 
       tells us little (if anything) about whether contracting 
       parties intended to opt out of the FAA's default 
       standards and incorporate one borrowed fr om state 
       law, we need to establish a default rule, and the one 
       we adopt is that a generic choice-of-law clause, 
       standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding that 
       contracting parties intended to opt out of the F AA's 
       default standards. 
 
Maj. Op. at 15. If a generic choice-of-law clause in an 
agreement "tells us little if anything" about whether the 
parties opted out of the FAA, then the plain words of the 
agreement are unclear. Wher e something is unclear or 
incapable of one possible meaning, it is ipso facto 
ambiguous. Websters' Third New International Dictionary of 
the English Language Unabridged 66 (1971); accord 
Sumitomo Mach. Corp. of Am. v. AlliedSignal, Inc. , 81 F.3d 
328, 332 (3d Cir. 1986) (an agreement is ambiguous if it is 
"susceptible of more than one meaning"). To argue that 
unclear is, by default, "not legally ambiguous," Maj. Op. at 
18 n.6, is, at best, interestingly ironic. 
 
My colleagues' attempt to answer this irony is that "a 
generic choice-of-law clause is insufficient as a matter of 
law to show that the contracting parties intended to 
displace the FAA's default rules.6  As a result, the contract 




6. My colleagues never state what the FAA's default rules are. Instead, 
they posit by ukase what they determine to be the default rule for a 
generic choice of law in an agreement containing an arbitration provision 
not electing its own internal choice of law. Their default rule is that, 
absent a "clear intent" to choose state law to govern an agreement's 
arbitration provision, the FAA applies. Maj. Op. at 3, 11-13. 
 
This default rule brings into focus where my colleagues and I part. 
They read the FAA, presumably by some preemptive principle (though 
they deny that this is a case of preemption, Maj. Op. at 12), as requiring 
"clear intent" to displace it. But, as I note in this concurring opinion, 
I 
believe that Mastrobuono takes a mor e nuanced approach. 
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I do not understand this statement. Mastr obuono 
nowhere states that a generic choice of law is insufficient as 
a matter of law to show that the parties intended to 
displace the FAA. The Supreme Court's position is more 
subtle. When an agreement involving interstate commerce 
is affected, the FAA applies to enfor ce arbitration. If the 
agreement containing an arbitration provision has no 
choice of law, the FAA by default supplies the rules of 
arbitration. By contrast, if the agreement contains an 
arbitration section with no choice of law but a generic 
choice of state law for the entire agreement, that state law 
choice supplies (a) the procedural rules for arbitration even 
if the FAA is in conflict (the teaching of Volt) and (b) the 
substantive rules for the arbitration unless the F AA is in 
conflict and the agreement does not explicitly choose the 
conflicting substantive rule (the teaching of Mastrobuono).7 
 
Thus, I do not agree with my colleagues that my 
approach "unduly complicate[s] the law in this area." Maj. 
Op. at 20. Rather, it comports with the Supr eme Court's 
rulings in Volt and Mastr obuono. 
 
       c. Reading LCOA's Choice-of-Law and Arbitration 
       Sections as Consistent 
 
Finally, Mastrobuono counsels "that a document should 
be read to give effect to all its pr ovisions and to render 
them consistent with each other." Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 
63. It is hardly internally inconsistent to determine that the 
choice of Pennsylvania law to govern the LCOA also governs 
its section on arbitration when that choice implicates a rule 
(which I believe is procedural and in no event inconsistent 




7. My colleagues write that any attempt to r econcile Volt and 
Mastrobuono is a "false premise," Maj. Op. at 19, and that I "craft a rule 
based on the assumption that the Supreme Court was wrong." Id. To the 
contrary, I believe that the Supreme Court itself supplies the 
reconciliation between these two cases. I would suggest, however, that in 
light of the Circuit split on this issue, see Maj. Op. at 19 n.7, the 
Supreme Court may wish to clarify its holding in Mastrobuono. 
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       2. Custom and Practice Among Drafters of Agr eements 
       Support the Determination that Pennsylvania Law 
       Governs the LCOA 
 
Custom and practice among the drafters of agr eements 
support my belief that the choice of Pennsylvania law in the 
LCOA governs the entire contract (including its arbitration 
provisions). In practice, choice-of-law pr ovisions are often 
highly contested. They are almost always negotiated in only 
one provision of the agreement and usually at (as in the 
LCOA) or near the end of that agreement. The choice of law 
almost invariably is meant to encompass the entir e 
agreement. Usually no thought is given to having a 
bifurcated choice of law, but if it is, the bifurcated choice of 
law is set forth in the choice-of-law provision itself. 
 
If RPS had intended that the FAA apply to the arbitration 
section of the LCOA, it would have so stated. Mor eover, to 
require within the arbitration section of the LCOA the 
redundant choice of Pennsylvania law leads logically to the 
conclusion that other provisions of the LCOA may also need 
to contain that redundant choice, e.g., provisions treating 
indemnification rights or termination events in contracts 
involving the interstate transportation of pr oducts. Thus, 
absent express preemption by the F AA,8 I believe that 
Pennsylvania law governs the LCOA's arbitration section. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Where does this leave us? We all agr ee that the intentions 
of contracting parties prevail over the F AA. I believe that 
the generic choice of state law to govern a contract also 
governs the arbitration provision within that contract when 
arbitration procedure is affected. The FAA preempts when 
substantive law is affected and the state law chosen 
conflicts with the FAA absent explicit agr eement to override 
that preemption. The standard to be applied when vacating 
or modifying an arbitrator's award is, I submit, a 
procedural matter. Notwithstanding, the Pennsylvania law 
for vacating arbitrators' awards does not conflict with the 
FAA. Therefore the PUAA should apply to the LCOA's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. There is none. Volt, 489 U.S. at 469 ("The FAA contains no express 
preemptive provision."). 
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arbitration provision. This result comports with Volt and 
Mastrobuono. Moreover, under Mastrobuono the contractual 
provisions here are ambiguous and must be construed 
against RPS, the drafter of the LCOA that chose only 
Pennsylvania law to govern it and now ar gues for the FAA 
as governing arbitration. Following this appr oach leaves the 
LCOA consistent internally. 
 
One thing is certain to me. No default rule is called for by 
which an unclear intent (as my colleagues find) becomes 
transmogrified as legally unambiguous. In any event, when 
all analysis is done, the result is the same whether under 
Pennsylvania law or the FAA -- the arbitrator's award is 
vacated. Thus, I concur with the Court's judgment but not, 
in part, my colleagues' reasoning. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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